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PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

MEETING OF MARCH 8 - 9, 1963 (The Board  
met with the President on March 9, 1963)

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PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

AGENDA FOR MEETINGS OF MARCH 8 - 9, 1963

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>TIME</u>	<u>SUBJECT</u>
<u>March 8th</u>		
1.	10:00 - 10:30	The Chairman's Time
2.	10:30 - 11:00	Status Report on Implementation of Prior Board Recommendations <u>Mr. Russell Ash</u>
3.	11:00 - 12:00	Discussions with the Director of Central Intelligence <u>Mr. John McCone</u>
4.	12:00 - 12:30	Intelligence Briefing on the Current Situation in Cuba <u>Mr. Desmond Fitzgerald, DDP Staff, CIA</u>
5.	12:30 - 1:30	Lunch
6.	1:30 - 2:30	Review of DCI's Comments on Board's Interim Report to the President dated December 28, 1962
7.	2:30 - End of Day	Preparation of Report to the President
<u>March 9th</u>		
8.	9:00 - 9:55	Resume Consideration of Item No. 7
9.	10:00 - 10:30 (Approx.)	Meeting with the President
10.	10:30 - END	Discussion of Future Board Business

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March 11, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: March 8 and 9, 1963 Meeting of the President's  
Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

The Board meeting of March 8 convened at 10:00 a.m., with the following in attendance: Messrs. Killian, Baker, Clifford, Doolittle, Gray, Land, Langer, Ash and Coyne. (Mr. Pace was unable to attend the two-day meeting because of absence from the country; Mr. Murphy was unable to join the meeting until later in the day.)

As the first order of business, in executive session, the Chairman reported on a number of items including the following.

The Chairman advised that on the previous day Mr. Murphy had informed Mr. Coyne that he had received a telephone call at his offices in New York from the Director of Central Intelligence. Mr. McCone indicated to Mr. Murphy that the President had talked with him about the Board's final report on the Cuba situation dated February 4; that the President had shown Mr. McCone a copy of the report, indicating that no other distribution was being made of the report at this time. Mr. Murphy advised that Mr. McCone was quite emotional in discussing the Board's report, stating that if the Board is going to insist on submitting the report, the top five people in CIA, including Mr. McCone, would have to resign from the Agency. Mr. Murphy pointed out to Mr. McCone that the report had already been formally submitted to the President by the Board. Mr. McCone then expressed to Mr. Murphy his concern and disagreement with the references in the report to the failure of intelligence. Mr. Murphy advised Mr. McCone that in his judgment, and indeed he thought in the judgment of all of the Board members, there was in fact a failure of intelligence and it was the duty of the Board to so state in its report to the President. Mr. Murphy expressed the view that the report was really mild. Mr. McCone indicated that even in retrospect there were only about seven of the thirty-five indicators listed in the report of offensive missiles in Cuba which might be considered valid. Mr. Murphy reiterated that Mr. McCone was quite emotional in discussing the above matter, saying if the report stood it could lead to resignations from DIA as well as CIA. At this point he mentioned to Mr. McCone that he was in New York at a meeting with others and didn't like discussing this aspect on the telephone and suggested they discuss the matter further when they next met.

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Moving to another subject, the DCI said that he was concerned about the prospects of a future nuclear explosion in Communist China, and to a lesser degree he was concerned about the prospects of such a development in Israel. He thought that the prospects of these developments brings up a most serious problem from the standpoint of psychological effect upon other nations should these developments take place, although there does not seem to be anything we can do about them.

Insofar as U-2 overflights of Communist China by Chinese Nationalist pilots are concerned, these missions are being flown in "Category 3" weather (instead of Category 2 weather conditions involving a maximum of 25% cloud cover) because there is a need for frequent missions. The DCI said that although these missions have not produced evidence of a reactor in operation in Communist China, there are some indications, e.g., a test area in Tibet, and the President has been alerted to this possibility.

The DCI said that somewhat of a problem is presented in Israel. Although we are close to the Israeli government, it appears to be withholding information on the extent of its nuclear activities. As in the past France is assisting Israel and the French government is helping the Israeli government build a nuclear reactor at the present time. In a building next to the reactor there is an installation which could be a chemical separation facility, but the Israelis deny that this is the case. Moreover, the DCI pointed out, the Israelis refuse to submit to international safeguards prescribed by the international atomic energy agency. Mr. McCone stated that he believes that the development of a nuclear weapon capability by Israel would have most serious effects on countries of the Middle East and, therefore, Mr. McCone is ready to repeat recommendations which he previously made to President Eisenhower that unless Israel joins in the international safeguards we should take certain economic reprisals against Israel. Mr. McCone observed that our government permits tax deductions on Israeli bonds, and we have given Israel billions of dollars in aid. Despite this the Israelis could well be proceeding without full knowledge on our part on an atomic energy program which could trigger grave trouble in the Middle East.

Finally, Mr. McCone reported that CIA has concluded that our policy on intelligence collection within the United States is wrong and particularly as it applies to Soviet Bloc Embassies and to telephone intercept coverage as well as exploitation of official Soviet Bloc personnel in the United States. Mr. McCone stated that he was going to propose that the CIA intensify its activities on these matters or that the FBI be directed to intensify their activities in these areas. He noted that basically this is an FBI responsibility but that it is his own view that this responsibility could more properly be carried out by the CIA. Mr. Clifford inquired as to

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whether the DCI would not encounter difficulty in trying to get this function transferred from FBI to CIA, and Mr. McCone responded that he does not care who carries out the responsibility as long as it is appropriately done and he added that he believes the CIA is qualified to do it. Dr. Land observed that this activity does not belong with the FBI; that coverage of an espionage agent is one thing but that exploiting Soviet Bloc coverage for intelligence collection purposes is quite another.

Mr. McCone advised that there is another dimension to this problem which involves increasing the number of CIA intelligence representatives in Moscow. He noted that CIA has only three employees in the Moscow Embassy. He pointed out that in Washington, D. C. and New York City out of a total of 392 Soviet official representatives CIA has identified 176 as intelligence officers of the KGB and GRU, a proportion of 45%. He added that 23% of the Soviet official representatives in London are intelligence officers and in France the figure is 36%.

Before departing the meeting Mr. McCone displayed to the Board a photograph demonstrating the success of the latest infrared photography taken of terrain from an altitude of 3500 feet.

Dr. Killian asked the DCI if the Board could have a copy of the new draft NRO agreement, and in response to this the DCI made a copy of the draft available later on in the day. Before Mr. McCone left the meeting he suggested that if the Board had any questions regarding the terms of the draft NRO agreement it would be appropriate to raise them with the Secretary of Defense or Mr. Gilpatric or Mr. McCone himself, rather than raising such questions at working levels at the Defense Department or the CIA. The DCI said that he did not want to inhibit in any way the discussions that the Board might want to have at any level at any time, and he noted that Dr. Land was to confer with Secretary Gilpatric the following day. (Dr. Land assured the DCI that the scheduled meeting was to be confined strictly to a technical discussion.)

This concluded the DCI's meeting with the Board and he and Mr. Kirkpatrick departed the meeting at 12:30 p.m.

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At 12:30 p.m., Mr. Arthur Lundahl of the NPIC, and Mr. William Tidwell joined the Board meeting. (Before beginning their presentations, Mr. Lundahl answered a question from a Board member by stating that the NPIC moved into its new quarters at the Naval Gun Factory on January 1, 1963, and it occupies the entire facility except for the occupancy of a part of one floor by the U. S. Geological Survey.) Mr. Tidwell proceeded to give the Board a briefing on the internal situation in Cuba. In essence Mr. Tidwell said that Cuba is a good example of Latin American Communism in action. The Castro regime has established very good security, but the internal political situation is considerably messed up in a controversy between the Castroites and the old-line members of the Communist Party of Cuba.

The sugar crop in Cuba is off one-third this year. The country will have a hard time economically next year and the Soviets will have to provide further substantial aid. Although the rationing program is difficult to enforce in Cuba, the people have by no means reached a starvation level. Bloc shipping carries most of the imports into the island, and non-Bloc shipping is negligible.

Because of the efficiency of the Castro internal security program, any significant organized revolt efforts have been prevented. Fifty per cent of the refugees who were interrogated during January thought that as of last summer there was a good chance of a successful revolution against Castro. After the Soviets reached a peak of introducing personnel and armaments in July, only five per cent thought that a revolt could succeed. When the Russians subsequently withdrew strategic missiles from Cuba fifteen per cent of the refugees thought that a revolt might succeed.

Some 1500 students from other Latin American countries have been given guerilla warfare training in Cuba. Castro's radio propaganda is urging other Latin American countries to follow the Cuban example. In answer to a question by Dr. Killian, Mr. Tidwell said that the Cubans are jamming U. S. radio broadcasts beamed at Latin America, but Mr. Tidwell had no information to indicate that our Government was jamming the Cuban broadcast activity. Mr. Tidwell then summarized information on the Cuban and Soviet orders of battle, along the lines of information contained in Current Intelligence Bulletins.

Dr. Baker raised a rhetorical question as to whether the Soviets were not in fact establishing in Cuba a command-and-control post for use in the event of a military offensive against the Western Hemisphere, and Dr. Baker asked if it were not true that never before

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March 14, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

Subject: Board Meeting with the President, March 9, 1963

At 10:00 A.M., on March 9, 1963, the Board met with the President in the Cabinet Room of the White House for the purpose of presenting the Board's report and recommendations growing out of its completed review of the foreign intelligence aspects of the Soviet military build-up in Cuba. Those present were Messrs. Killian, Doolittle, Land, Langer, Gray, Clifford, Baker, Murphy, and Messrs. Coyne and Ash. Mr. McGeorge Bundy was also present.

Dr. Killian informed the President that the Board had recommendations to present based on the Cuba episode. He recalled to the President that the Board had submitted two previous reports, one - an interim report dated December 28, 1962, containing recommendations of such urgency that the Board forwarded them prior to completing its review of Cuba; and a more comprehensive report dated February 4, 1963, in which the Board set forth its complete findings based on a detailed investigation of the Cuba situation from the standpoint of foreign intelligence coverage. Dr. Killian said that the recommendations which the Board was now presenting should be considered in the light of the two previous reports, particularly the report dated February 4, 1963.

Dr. Killian then presented the Board's recommendations, reading from the written report which was forwarded to the President under date of March 8, 1963. In reading this report to the President, Dr. Killian directed attention to the fact that most of the recommendations which were being presented were an outgrowth of the Board's study of Cuba, but that two of the recommendations dealt with major problems affecting the over-all foreign intelligence effort.

Dr. Killian stated Recommendations 1 through 4 of the March 8, 1963 report.

Following Dr. Killian's statement of Recommendation 4 regarding low-level aerial surveillance flights over Cuba, the President observed that such flights had not been suspended but were being reserved for coverage of particularly critical intelligence targets should the situation warrant, as, for example, the February 9, 1963 low-level mission. Mr. Bundy

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commented that two or three important targets in Cuba have been identified since the February 9 low-level mission, but the approval of low-level coverage of these new targets is being held in abeyance pending the completion of efforts by Attorney Donovan to obtain the release of some twenty Americans held prisoner in Cuba, including three individuals whom the United States is particularly desirous of returning to this country. The President asked for elaboration on the Board's recommendation for the development of long focal length cameras to be used in U-2 aircraft. Dr. Land explained that some time ago an effort was made to develop such a camera but the earlier version was not a success, and the development efforts were suspended because there was not an immediate need for a camera having this particular capability, although at the present time such a camera would be most useful in covering such Cuban targets as caves and other installations suspected of being used for concealment of materials and equipment. Dr. Land thought that the cost of developing a long focal length camera would be relatively inexpensive in comparison to the cost of such projects as DISCOVERER.

Dr. Killian then presented Recommendations 5 through 7 of the March 8 report.

When Dr. Killian stated Recommendation 8 concerning proposals for and the monitoring of unique intelligence operations, Mr. Bundy made the comment that the Special Group fully agrees with this recommendation and has instituted procedures designed to assure that the Special Group is informed regarding operational delays encountered in the course of carrying out surveillance missions previously approved by the Special Group.

Dr. Killian then stated Recommendation 11 of the Board's report dated March 8.

In connection with Dr. Killian's statement of Recommendation 12 on the need for improving national intelligence estimates, Mr. Bundy reiterated the point which the Board had made to the effect that the present system for producing national intelligence estimates is being run by the originators of the system, and the present mechanism for producing such estimates is a "founders' body." Dr. Langer said it is true that the estimative group has a highly trained staff which has been in existence for many years, but the Board has not yet conducted a specific study of its operations. Dr. Killian summarized the tenor of this recommendation of the Board by saying that a monolithic point of view is not necessarily the best estimate.

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Turning next to two recommendations of a general nature, Dr. Killian stated Recommendations 13 and 14 of the March 8 report dealing with the subjects of scientific intelligence resources and the effective organization and management of the National Reconnaissance Office.

Following Dr. Killian's presentation, the President expressed his appreciation for the Board's efforts and said that he would follow through on the recommendations which had been made.

Referring to the thirty-five intelligence reports containing indicator-type data which were dealt with in the Board's February 4 report, the President observed that these indications were "pretty thin." The President observed that first there was the Berlin Wall incident and then the Cuba development, and in retrospect the President found it extraordinary that our Government had not obtained more advance information with respect to those situations.

The President said that we should have accomplished a penetration of the Castro regime at a relatively high level in the Cuban Government.

Dr. Land stated that he and Dr. Langer had been engaged in recent discussions of Dr. Land's concern about the manner in which our national intelligence estimates are produced. Dr. Land thought that, under the present system, it seemed that no meaning could be derived from particular facts or information unless the information could be fitted into patterns which the estimators already had in mind. The Board is therefore suggesting, Dr. Land said, that the CIA see if there is not a need for trained professionals who are not only open-minded, but whose careers are devoted to fitting intelligence information into all possible patterns. In the Cuba situation, Dr. Land pointed out, there was a fixed pattern in the minds of estimators to the effect that refugee reports concerning offensive missiles were in reality reports concerning surface-to-air missiles and installations. Dr. Land said that the Board was not proposing a policy under which the President would review raw intelligence reports, but the Board felt that the estimators should form the various alternative patterns which can be reliably derived from an analysis of intelligence, in order that policy makers may have the benefit of such alternatives. Dr. Langer said that on the other hand the estimators have to act on rationality and cannot assume that the enemy is acting on an irrational basis.

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The President said that looking back on the Cuba situation it is now apparent that the SAM sites were related to the deployment of offensive missiles. The President observed that there has not been made, to his knowledge, an analysis of the assumption under which the Soviets operated in Cuba, and it would be of some academic interest, at least, to know why the Soviets did not use their SA-2's against our over-flight operations. Dr. Land observed that if the Soviet camouflage teams in Cuba had been up to schedule along with the Soviet schedule for deployment of offensive missiles, we would not have found the missiles, and it was by the grace of God that we did find them.

Mr. Clifford, referring to earlier references to the need for clandestine agent penetration of Cuba, said that the Board had concluded that the absence of clandestine coverage is attributable to a lack of imagination on the part of our intelligence elements over a long period of years during which we enjoyed close relations with the Cuban Government. Therefore, Mr. Clifford said, the Board is concerned about the adequacy of such coverage at the present time in places like Brazil and Argentina. Mr. Murphy observed that originally the CIA set out to use U. S. diplomatic establishments as a cover for CIA intelligence operations only for an initial period, but these cover arrangements became permanent. Mr. Murphy noted that in discussion with the Board the Director of Central Intelligence has said that it is difficult to achieve deep cover for clandestine agent operations, and while Mr. Murphy agrees that this task is of course difficult, he has seen no evidence that concerted efforts have been made, for example, to penetrate the Castro regime. Mr. Clifford recalled that on the preceding day Mr. McCone had directed the Board's attention to the fact that whereas the CIA has three operatives in Moscow, the Soviet Union has 153 intelligence officers in the United States. Dr. Killian informed the President that the Board lays great stress on the need for a real effort to increase our clandestine agent operations.

Referring again to the reports and findings of the Board, the President said that one problem is reflected in the instance where the Secretary of State had recommended that a particular U-2 surveillance mission over Cuba be broken up into four over-flight missions. The President said he was not suggesting that this was not a prudent suggestion by the Secretary of State, but that this made him conscious of the fact that there is perhaps a lack of expertise on the part of policy makers with respect to certain intelligence operations. The President commented that one flight was flown over an area where the aircraft could well have been shot down.

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The President then referred to the fact that Dr. Killian was retiring as Chairman of the Board in May. The President expressed deep appreciation for the work which Dr. Killian has done and the valuable contribution which Dr. Killian has made to the country. The President recalled that the Board has conducted three post-mortems on intelligence situations, and that these efforts of the Board have been most useful, particularly in the case of Cuba. The President added that he wished to express his appreciation for the effective manner in which the Board has carried out its duties in the past. He stated that the Board's contribution has been most valuable. In addition to its being valuable to the President, the Board has also contributed in an important way through the awareness which it has created in the intelligence community of its continuing operations and continuing review of intelligence activities. The President said that he was very much indebted to all of the Board members and is hopeful that the Board will continue its present operations for he considered them to be invaluable.

Dr. Killian expressed his gratitude for the President's comments, and then said that, as a footnote to the Board's present report, the members wished to say to the President that he has a right to expect high quality performance on the part of the intelligence community, and the Board suggests that the President see fit to emphasize to the intelligence community the necessity for producing adequate information.

The President then referred to current criticisms and inquiries which have been received from various quarters concerning the role of the Government in the Bay of Pigs invasion, and the President wondered whether the Board felt that the Administration should be more responsive to such criticisms and inquiries. Mr. Murphy commented that we would be well advised to follow the practice of Prime Minister Macmillan who responds to such criticism and inquiries with a statement to the effect that we do not discuss our intelligence activities in public.

Dr. Killian assured the President that members of the Board feel that to the greatest extent possible the Administration should refrain from making intelligence disclosures with respect to the Bay of Pigs incident. Mr. Clifford thought that the situation had been summed up humorously and accurately in a recent statement by Congressman Mahon who questioned whether the real problem was a lack of intelligence information or, on the other hand, a lack of intelligence on the part of self-appointed critics. The President stated that he too was impressed with Congressman Mahon's statement and, in fact, after the statement appeared in the press, he called Congressman Mahon and commended him on its content.

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The one-hour meeting with the President terminated with the President repeating his expressions of appreciation for the work of the Board.

A. R. Ash

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January 21, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT:

Interim Report to the President by the  
President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory  
Board, dated December 28, 1962

We have set down the several paragraphs of the subject report followed by our comments.

1. The recommendation of the Board. Great uncertainties about present Soviet efforts in Cuba indicate the necessity of a continuing aggressive intelligence effort to equip our policy makers with timely and adequate information to meet the possibility of continuing Soviet confrontation in Cuba. We must resist any tendency towards a let down in our intelligence effort against Cuba in the wake of intelligence successes resulting from our military reconnaissance missions over the island. In making this observation we are mindful that in a quite different atmosphere the Central Intelligence Agency did not mount effective clandestine intelligence collection operations in Cuba for an eight-month period following the Bay of Pigs invasion.

Comment. We agree with the principle stated in the first sentence of the recommendation and the need to continue an aggressive intelligence effort against Cuba. This view was advanced by the Director of Central Intelligence at the meeting of the President's Board on December 7, 1962 and again at the meeting of the Board on December 28. The DCI informed the Board at these meetings that it was important that there be extensive intelligence operations to find out the trend of developments in Cuba and that efforts to get agents into Cuba were being intensified. It should be noted, however, that in clandestine intelligence operations the allocation of additional manpower and funds to a task, although helpful, does not necessarily assure a corresponding improvement in production or accomplishment.

Since early 1962 the CIA has increased its effort to collect intelligence information on Cuba. The operations for this purpose have been

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conducted vigorously as a matter of urgency. Following the misfortune at the Bay of Pigs, there was a decrease in the clandestine effort against Cuba. Even so, from April 15, 1961 through December 1961 the Clandestine Services of CIA disseminated 608 information reports on Cuba, of which 406 reports came from sources inside Cuba. The Contact Division/OO of CIA disseminated 1764 reports on Cuba during the period April 8 to December 1961. During the period from April 1961 through December 1961, seventeen resident agents were recruited in Cuba and are still active. In addition, five resident assets, two with sub-assets, recruited prior to April 1961, were maintained during this same eight-month period and are still active. There were other recruitments and numerous attempts that failed.

The period of sixty days following the Bay of Pigs invasion was a difficult one for the Agency. The Taylor Committee, composed of General Taylor, the Attorney General, Mr. Allen Dulles, and Admiral Burke, began its survey of the Bay of Pigs operation on April 22 and continued throughout May and June. This Committee took much of the time and effort of precisely those people responsible for Cuban operations, both in Miami and in Washington. There were demands for written papers and documents, as well as personal interviews of key people. Changes in the top echelon of the Agency, anticipated during the summer and implemented in the fall of 1961, had their effect on Cuban operations. While it was generally agreed and understood that our effort to collect information must continue, specific policy guidance was not given to CIA and funds necessary to carry out expanded programs were not approved by higher authority until August 4, 1961.

The newly appointed DCI, following his review of the situation in mid-December 1961, directed that the effort against Cuba be intensified. This led to the establishment, on March 8, 1962, of Task Force W as a separate entity within the Agency for the purpose of mounting a maximum effort, particularly in the collection of information, against Cuba. As of March 8, 1962 the Task Force had a personnel strength in the field and at Headquarters of 335. As of January 1, 1963, the total number of personnel devoting full time to the efforts of the Task Force was 594. Of this 594, 147 were from other agencies and other components of the Agency outside the Clandestine Services. Total financial obligations during fiscal year 1962 were \$17,291,000. Estimated obligations for fiscal year 1963 totaled \$28,200,000, but now have been scaled to \$24,000,000 with the final figure dependent upon future policy.

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2. The recommendation of the Board. We recommend intensified, hard-hitting efforts to increase our capability for obtaining significant intelligence through clandestine collection operations (espionage). Despite noteworthy intelligence results obtainable through scientific and technical means, we still have as great a need as ever for carefully selected, human-resource espionage operations, professionally executed on the basis of the soundest planning judgments and the most competent target selection processes which the intelligence community can achieve. The Cuban experience is a case in point, for we now have few meaningful espionage assets on the island and without such assets we have little hope of developing the kind and degree of hard intelligence which is required on such critical matters as: a) the plans and intentions of the Soviet Government and the Castro regime for future operations within Cuba or for future operations launched from Cuba against other Latin American countries; b) the alleged concealment of offensive weapons in caves or other locations which are incapable of being probed by technical intelligence means; and c) the actual numbers of Soviet troops in Cuba, their precise deployments, equipments, activities and objectives.

In numerous countries our serious lack of clandestine agent resources is compounded by heavy reliance on the use of official cover as a cloak for our intelligence-gathering activities abroad. Again, Cuba provides an important lesson. When the rupture of diplomatic relations in January 1961 forced the recall of U. S. intelligence personnel who had been operating under diplomatic cover provided by the American Embassy in Havana, we did not have remaining on the island - and we still do not have - adequate, deep-cover, clandestine agent networks on which to rely. Priority U. S. intelligence requirements in Latin America and elsewhere call for intensive efforts by the appropriate intelligence agencies of the Government to lay the groundwork for deep-cover, clandestine intelligence operations which are not dependent upon official cover and which will not be affected by a breach in diplomatic relations.\*

Events of the past few years suggest that dramatic advances in advanced intelligence methods such as high altitude and satellite photography have obscured the role of human beings as collection and transmission media, trained and equipped with the most sophisticated technical aids, and supported by essential logistics and communications. We are gravely concerned about the progressive loss of our capability in the field of clandestine intelligence operations and in our view there is a need for the preparation of new plans for the recruiting, training and equipping of agents for comprehensive clandestine intelligence collection, particularly in Latin America.

\* The need for clandestine intelligence coverage has been emphasized previously in reports of advisory bodies constituted by the President to review our foreign

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intelligence activities. These advisory groups, which incidentally included some of the members of your present Board, have made specific recommendations on the subject. In 1954 the Doolittle Committee emphasized the need for: a) developing nonofficial cover facilities; b) the placement of "deep-cover sleeper agents" with a corresponding decrease in dependence upon official cover; c) the creation of a long-range, deep-cover planning system; and d) the promulgation of cover doctrine and procedure. In 1955 the Technological Capabilities Panel of the President's Science Advisory Committee, noting that "we should today be laying the groundwork for extensive covert operations in every country available to our agents", recommended that "a heavy long-term investment should be made in the preparation of covert agents as eventual sources of high-level intelligence." More recently, in its report of July 2, 1961, your Board recommended that the new Director of Central Intelligence consider the desirability and means of achieving a deeper cover for all clandestine and covert activities of the Central Intelligence Agency, and that the disproportionate number of CIA personnel operating under diplomatic cover be reduced on an orderly basis, having in mind their replacement by agents under deep cover.

Comment. We agree with the principle of intensifying hard-hitting efforts to increase the production of significant intelligence information through espionage. This we will continue to do on a worldwide basis within the limits of our resources. We strongly support the principle expressed in the second sentence above. We agree that it is important for those responsible for the collection of intelligence information to bear in mind that there is much sorely needed information that cannot be collected by scientific and technical means. Such information is often in the human mind or the written word. Frequently information collected by scientific and technical means must be supplemented by information derived from human sources to interpret it or to give it true significance. As Mr. Helms informed the Board on December 7, 1962, there is an impressive illustration of this interplay of information from technical and human sources in the identification of missiles and their sites in Cuba. Material derived from classic espionage played a vital role in the community's analysis of Soviet missile activities in Cuba last October. Specifically, Soviet TOP SECRET documents acquired by a CIA agent concerning the preparation of R-12 MRBM's for launching, and the layout of sites for such missiles, provided the primary basis for evaluating the degree of completion and the state of readiness of the MRBM's in Cuba. These reports also complemented photo intelligence by providing organizational facts on R-12 units, and identifying specific ground support equipment which appeared in photographs.

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Material from agent operations also helped interpret COMINT relating to Soviet activity in Cuba. Letter-number designations for components of Soviet missiles and their ground support equipment which appear in material supplied by a CIA agent have enabled NSA to identify items being shipped from the USSR to Cuba.

In considering the statement that "we now have few meaningful espionage assets on the island" it should be remembered that meaningful intelligence is obtained not only on the island but elsewhere as well. We do have assets which report on Cuba, such as Cuban diplomats, liaison services, Cuban seamen, and audio operations against Cuban installations abroad, all of which are not on the island but do provide meaningful information about events inside Cuba. Among these assets are some that do provide us with insights into the Castro regime's plans and intentions. We have on the island itself over 130 resident singleton agents who have been and are providing us with a variety of intelligence information on Cuba. Among these are those agents who furnished the intelligence community with significant reports on aspects of the Soviet military buildup in Cuba last summer, particularly on SAM's, cruise missiles, MIG-21's, IL-28's, and strategic missiles. These agent reports, combined with refugee reports, initially resulted in the targeting for the U-2 flights which identified the SAM's and other weapons and later contributed to the targeting for the U-2 flight of October 14 which discovered the MRBM site at San Cristobal. Today, there are among the more than 130 resident agents in Cuba approximately twenty agent sources with a capability of providing significant information on military developments and approximately ten with access to significant political information. We do not have sources with complete access to the "plans and intentions" of the Castro regime. It must be remembered, however, that agents inside Cuba are operating within a classic denied area with ever-increasing police controls and where Cubans are largely excluded from Soviet military installations. We will never be satisfied that we have a sufficient number of agent resources on the island of Cuba; however, the quantity of agents is not the most difficult problem. Reaching the targets within a country organized as Cuba is now organized is the greatest difficulty.

The second paragraph of this recommendation appears to confuse American operatives under nonofficial cover with sources under deep cover who can survive and report after the severance of diplomatic relations.

There is an inclination by some critics of the current clandestine effort to consider an increase in nonofficial cover with a corresponding

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decrease in official cover as the solution to many of the problems of clandestine activity in foreign areas. Nonofficial cover as used in this sense means an arrangement which provides a plausible reason for the American representative being in the foreign area in a capacity other than as a representative of the Government of the United States. The repetitive advocacy of more nonofficial cover and less official cover is usually for reasons other than the superiority of nonofficial cover in the clandestine collection of intelligence information. We realize that there are other important considerations which make it undesirable to have a disproportionate number of intelligence operatives under diplomatic and consular cover. We contend, however, that only under proper and special conditions is nonofficial cover superior to official cover in the clandestine gathering of information. By and large official cover is more productive. The question of establishing and maintaining under viable deep cover, sources of information who can survive and report through clandestine channels is quite another matter and really has little to do with whether our American intelligence officers are under official or nonofficial cover. These deep cover sources must be of foreign nationality, at least appear to be so, to operate effectively in a country hostile to the United States and especially in a police state after diplomatic relations have been broken. But the recruitment of such sources and their organization can usually be done more effectively by American representatives under official cover than by Americans under nonofficial cover. Had all the CIA representatives in Cuba at the time diplomatic relations were severed in 1961 been there under nonofficial cover they would probably have been able to remain only a short time longer than our representatives under official cover and those who did remain could not have operated effectively under the surveillance that would have undoubtedly been placed on them. We do agree, of course, that selectively we should make an effort to lay the groundwork for deep cover, clandestine operations that can survive a break in diplomatic relations and other crises.

It is in order to consider briefly the nature, advantages and limitations of nonofficial cover. It is to be noted first and foremost that the CIA as a matter of avowed policy, is committed to the use of nonofficial cover in all instances, where it is available and its use is justified. In many areas of the world, however, nonofficial cover does not exist or, if it does, it exists under such circumstances as to have little use for the conduct of espionage. This is true of the denied areas, more particularly the Bloc countries; the quasi-denied areas such as Iraq and Egypt; and the under-developed countries, where there are no facilities of science, commerce and education from which

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cover might devolve within the society. In those areas where nonofficial cover may provide legality for an agent's residence in the area and concealment of his ultimate objectives, it still may not give him access to designated targets. Unless it does, nonofficial cover is unproductive. The identification of a target and access to it through a viable cover instrument is an essential combination in the employment of nonofficial cover.

The more tactical operations (particularly in those countries where CIA presence is welcome or at least tolerated) are better done by individuals under official cover. For example, liaison and joint operations are more effectively and more cheaply carried on from an official installation than from a nonofficial one, for the simple reason that secure files, work space and communications are readily at hand. It is poor economy of manpower and overseas dollars to conduct this collaborative effort through the usage of the much more expensive nonofficial cover unless some clear advantage is gained thereby.

No sweeping or general conclusion can be applied to a relationship of official cover to nonofficial cover, except in those few places where there is relatively a free choice between the two. But since there are not very many of those, each country must be considered as a problem in itself. The augmentation of nonofficial cover assets lies in closer examination of the operational possibilities of nonofficial cover in each individual station to insure that it is employed in instances where it is available and will enable the representative to do his job or accomplish his task. We must start with a consideration of our objective in a given area and determine if we can reasonably expect to reach it through nonofficial cover.

To this end, some months ago the CIA initiated a worldwide planning program. Each station and base chief was asked to evaluate his operations, present and projected, to determine the most efficient balance between staff under official cover and staff under nonofficial cover, to be achieved, as a target date, five years hence. Practically all of these plans have now been received in Washington and are in process of Headquarters evaluation. It was clear even before the planning was undertaken, that certain stations needed seasoned officers under nonofficial cover and that there was a big void in the category of the officer who, as a young man, might locate under nonofficial cover in a given community and spend the better part of his career serving both the purposes of his cover and CIA.

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During the past year there has been a gratifying improvement on both counts. These programs will continue to have high priority and be the subject of intensive efforts.

As evidence of our concentration on this important subject we have recently established in the Clandestine Services of CIA a new component, the Domestic Operations Division and Station (DODS), which will be responsible for the management of relations between the Agency and private enterprise in the United States. In this component has been placed responsibility for the maximum utilization of the facilities offered by business, education, foundations, etc. in furthering and supporting the activities of the Agency. We expect that the effort of this component will lead to improved nonofficial cover and more extensive assistance by the nonofficial resources of the U. S. in many aspects of the Agency's activity.

The best possibility of attaining intelligence assets after a break in diplomatic relations or a hostile takeover lies in the creation and maintenance of a dormant skeletal network prior thereto, with activation on signal from without at some future date. This plan has actually been followed in cooperation with local Services in certain European areas and it has proved to be burdensome and very costly in terms of both manpower and money. CIA does not have the capability in addition to its current operations to create and maintain this type of staybehind on a very large scale. This does not mean that nothing should be done in those cases where a hostile takeover or a break in relations appear probable. Efforts to penetrate the communist apparatus and communist cadres should be heavily augmented. Other minority groups should also be penetrated. Individuals who have not been active in either espionage or national politics and who might survive the takeover should be identified, cleared and even approached at a given point in the developing situation. All in all, more should and can be done in those cases. The answer to the problem of the survival of networks after takeover, however, does not lie in the deployment of more Americans under nonofficial cover.

In each of the last two years, the Department of State and CIA have jointly made a searching examination of the officer manpower at all posts (stations and bases) of which there are 165. Officer ceilings for CIA as of August 1, 1962, were fixed at 470 positions, or an average of 2.8 positions per post. Giving effect to reductions and adjustments resulting from that examination, there are at present 7 posts where there are 10 or more FSR positions, and in addition only 20 posts where the FSR positions are 5 or

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more, but less than 10.

An informed current estimate is that the Soviet Union employs worldwide under official cover more than 1300 operations officers (known or suspect KGB, 652; known or suspect GRU, 328; known or suspect RIS (Service unidentified), 312). There are about 370 Soviet permanent officials serving in New York City and Washington, D. C. Of these 370 permanent Soviet "officials", there are 140 positively identified intelligence officers and 33 who are suspects. In addition, there are hundreds of Soviets who visit the United States with the U. S. General Assembly or with other Soviet delegations and groups. Almost without exception, these groups contain Soviet intelligence officers under official cover. While the Soviet official representation in the U. S. has included 140 individuals known to be engaged in intelligence activities the CIA has never had more than four on duty in the U. S. Embassy in Moscow.

Overseas, the present total of American operatives under non-official cover is 1000, plus or minus, including a hard core of 300 staff agents and career agents. The figure of about 1000 compares with a figure of 550 in 1955, the first year the consolidated figures are available. Perhaps more significant is the fact that the "hard core" totals have risen to 300 from a total of 200 in 1959. When it comes to the employment of foreign nationals, figures are much less reliable because the records of secondary agents often exist only in operational reports. However, in terms of primary agents of foreign nationality on a worldwide basis, the number is on the order of 10,000.

There has not been a progressive loss of our capability in the field of clandestine intelligence operations. On the contrary our capability has increased. As an example during the last half of 1960, 2514 sources produced 23,034 positive information reports disseminated by the Clandestine Services of CIA. During the last half of 1962, 2850 sources produced 22,256 positive information reports disseminated by the Clandestine Services of the CIA. The smaller number of reports during the second period resulted from a concerted effort to reduce marginal reporting and encourage fewer but better reports.

On the situation in Latin America, the South America Assessment Team in its report of January 10, 1962 stated that in general CIA had established a healthy foundation for the collection of intelligence information;

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that this base should be retained; that what was needed from then on was expansion, strengthening and refinement of capabilities in various fields of activity. During the past year CIA has made progress in expanding, strengthening and refining its capability in the clandestine collection of intelligence information in Latin America. CIA has opened new stations in Kingston, Jamaica; Georgetown, British Guiana and the Paramaribo, Dutch Guiana and has opened bases in Cordoba, Argentina; Merida, Mexico and in Belem, Belo Horizonte, Curitiba and Salvador, Brazil. During the past year, CIA personnel in the field in Latin America has been increased by 54, including 24 officers under nonofficial cover. This makes a total of 365 officers in Latin America. A substantial additional number of officers under non-official cover will be assigned to the field during the coming year. Increased emphasis on the collection of intelligence information in Latin America during the past year has resulted in the activation of 263 additional clandestine sources of information. CIA now has 1949 agents approved for use in Latin America - an increase of 242 in the past year. Penetrations of Communist Parties and Front Organizations in Latin America now number 142.

3. The recommendation of the Board. We recommend, while it is still possible, continued high-level and low-level (as required) aerial reconnaissance of Cuba as one means of acquiring photographic and signals intelligence concerning the military installations, the military forces, the modern military weaponry and the highly sophisticated communications facilities which the Soviets retain in Cuba. This surveillance effort must be accompanied by priority planning for the development of acceptable substitutes (such as drones, improved satellite reconnaissance, etc.) in lieu of present aerial reconnaissance coverage, when and if such coverage is denied us by air defense systems now being installed by the Soviets in Cuba on a scale matched only by Soviet air defense installations in the areas of Moscow and Leningrad. We also recommend the launching at the earliest possible date of a vigorous clandestine agent program to provide surreptitious collection of on-the-ground photography of intelligence targets in Cuba, as an essential supplement to aerial surveillance of the island.

Comment. We agree in general with this recommendation. High-level aerial reconnaissance of Cuba acquiring both photographic and signals intelligence concerning the military installation, the military forces, the modern military weaponry, and highly sophisticated communications facilities in Cuba is continuing. At present low-level reconnaissance is not included in the Cuban reconnaissance program. Authority will be sought for its use

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should a sufficiently suspicious objective of potentially offensive character be reported which cannot be covered by high altitude photography or other sources.

The United States Intelligence Board has approved SIGINT requirements for the use of a drone against Cuba when the circumstances require. A photographic drone capability exists and separate requirements for its use can be generated when necessary. This capability is now on a standby basis and could be activated within 10 days. Present satellite reconnaissance capabilities cannot provide the detailed information necessary for meeting our requirements in Cuba. Even though a decision were made to program a satellite for the southern latitudes, sacrificing the presently achievable resolution over priority targets in the USSR, it is felt that the results would not be satisfactory. The best resolution that might be obtained falls far short of the present requirement. The asset cannot be used on an "on-call" basis either in terms of launching or in terms of insuring that a pass will cover Cuba, and if it does that such pass could occur in satisfactory weather conditions. Whereas improved satellite performance is in the offing, these factors would still apply for the foreseeable future.

With regard to on-the-ground photography of targets in Cuba, as pointed out above we are vigorously attempting to infiltrate or recruit agents in Cuba. Selected agents will be provided photographic equipment. It should be realized, however, that the photographing of prime intelligence targets in a denied area, even with cleverly concealed cameras, is difficult.

4. The recommendation of the Board. We urge that without further delay a major clandestine agent effort be directed to the obtaining of vitally-needed signals intelligence available from the array of extraordinarily sophisticated communications equipment which is being installed and operated in Cuba by the USSR. Some of the systems already identified appear to be under command control running from the Ministry of Defense in Moscow to key Soviet ground, naval and air force commands in Cuba, and their permanent installation on the island marks the first time that they have been deployed at such distances from the protected confines of the Soviet domain. The proximity to the United States of this communication equipment presents our intelligence collectors with unique opportunities to seek the means for "reading" not only the current traffic carried on highly secure communications systems of the USSR, but also back traffic which has been so securely protected as to defy our most sophisticated efforts to break it. We recognize

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that continued priority must be devoted to attacking this problem through our present and planned use of intercept and direction finding facilities employed at vantage points on land, in the air and at sea. In addition to such coverage we strongly recommend that: a) clandestine agent programs be devised and set in motion at once in Cuba, with a view to acquiring through surreptitious means, including the use of portable recording equipment capable of concealment on an agent's person, the emanations from Soviet encoding machines which are captureable at reasonable distance from the communications centers at which they are employed, and b) that steps be taken to ensure the readiness of commando-type or covert action plans and task forces as may be required for the pre-emption of Soviet communication sites and encryption machines in the event that opportunities for such action should be provided under circumstances of successful internal revolt or invasion.

Comment. The collection of Signals Intelligence from within Cuba has been under way for some time. The most sophisticated of Soviet equipments were not identified as being in Cuba until October 28, 1962, and it has not yet been possible to identify their precise location, through either electronic or agent means. Arrangements are now underway which may enable NSA to provide the Clandestine Services with considerably more accurate supplementary D/F results. An airborne D/F "homing" technique will be utilized to attempt to pinpoint the locations of transmitters in other than heavily populated areas. The first target mission is now scheduled for approximately February 1, 1963. Under most favorable conditions, however, it is not anticipated that this effort would yield position accuracy of better than a kilometer. Further refinement of such results would be dependent upon a clandestine close-in effort to determine the exact locations where the devices are being used. There is no information available to indicate that these installations are "permanent", although there is no doubt, as of this date, that they are under complete Soviet control. Without question, Cubans are not permitted access to the areas in which the machines are located nor are Cubans being trained in the use of the machines. The identification of the more sophisticated equipments comes from Signals Intelligence, and the variety of agent sources available to us in Cuba has not reported on any aspect of this equipment, indicating that the Cuban officials themselves with whom our agents are in touch are not aware of the nature of the equipment the Soviets have put into Cuba.

Inasmuch as the only information on these devices has been derived by purely cryptanalytic attack, no data are available concerning their technical

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or possible radiation characteristics. Since it is virtually certain that the Soviets are aware of the existence of possibly compromising radiations from cipher equipments as well as from electromechanical printing devices which are at times associated with them, it is not considered likely that a radiation attack can be accomplished using simple detection devices. Additional support is lent to this opinion by the complete absence of Soviet use of any enciphering equipment in any embassy or mission outside the iron curtain. The only exception in the past has been the use of one or two cipher equipments by very special VIP parties on Soviet naval vessels. In the event that the machines do not have electrical circuits, there would be in such case no radiation or emanations which would be captureable at any distance from the centers in which the machines are located. Considerable research is currently being conducted to overcome the technical difficulties in portability and sensitivity which are inherent in an effort to intercept by means of clandestine agents emanations from Soviet equipments.

In view of the lack of information noted above, the clandestine effort against Soviet COMINT in Cuba must consist of (a) first attempting to locate the machines themselves, and (b) devising possible means of access to the machines. CIA is currently reviewing all possible locations in Cuba where the machines may possibly be located in an effort to develop target data on each location, including terrain, security factors, order of battle of Soviet units, and personalities on each possible installation. In the absence of adequate D/Fing and with the lack of information on the location of the machines, we cannot be too sanguine about locating the target installation with sufficient accuracy to devise ways and means of creating a feasible operational situation within any scheduled phasing. Every effort is being made, however, to develop more precise targeting data. These efforts to locate the targets and to identify the facilities and agents who may eventually be used, have been given the highest priority.

The Board's recommendation that there be available commando-type or covert action plans and task forces to take advantage of an internal revolt or an invasion has been the subject of past and present planning and preparation by CIA, and discussions have been held with NSA concerning the best means of achieving this end. These discussions will continue with NSA and with DOD with the objective of creating the needed stand-by facility and incorporating it into the appropriate military plans with specific assignment of responsibilities. In addition, CIA has in being externally held assets which can be utilized for a commando-raid operation, in the event of a

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significant internal uprising. Without the precise location of the machines, however, even at such a time it will be difficult to target the commando raid with any assurances of success. It must be borne in mind, however, that any such direct action, short of open U. S. military invasion, is likely to lead to Soviet reprisals in one form or another against sophisticated U. S. communications equipments. The Soviets will probably, in such event, not be hampered by as many considerations as would the U. S., should this lead to a chain reaction on the part of the Soviets. At the same time, the intelligence value of the equipments obtained must be constantly reviewed if the information is to be obtained by other than surreptitious means.

In sum, therefore, this is a problem with which the intelligence community has long been troubled. There are no panaceas, and even though the location of the equipment, for the first time so close to U. S. shores, seems, therefore, to make it appear easier to obtain the required intelligence, the facts of the matter are to the contrary in that the Soviets are still maintaining full and complete control over the equipment just as they have done in the past in more contiguous areas to the Soviet Union.

5. The recommendation of the Board. In instances where exceptional intelligence collection techniques involving unusual risks are proposed to meet priority intelligence objectives and their use is opposed on ground that elements of risk are present, the matter should be referred to the Presidential level for final decision. We recommend this procedure because our Government may well be faced with the necessity of assuming increasing risks if we are to acquire a firm intelligence basis for estimating present and future Soviet capabilities and intentions in Cuba and in other potential trouble spots.

Comment. We concur in this recommendation. We assume that term "Presidential level" means the President.

6. The recommendation of the Board. In view of evidence from Cuba that the Soviets are resorting to use of camouflage of missile installations, we recommend that the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) assign a high priority to experiments, under controlled conditions, to determine the effectiveness of short and long range photography against various types of camouflage and concealment of photographic targets. We believe that new sensing and illumination methods may now be available which would be of assistance in reaching a solution of this critical problem.

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Comment. We agree. The Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance already has recommended the use of camouflage detection film in reconnaissance of Cuba. This has never been tried so the COMOR has requested that tests be made of the available camouflage detection film and that the results be reported to COMOR in order that it may be aware of the full nature of the capability should requirements indicate a need for its use. In addition, the Committee has requested a briefing by the Joint Reconnaissance Center on the full range of FLASH LIGHT photography both low- and high-altitude so that it may be fully aware of the assets available to meet requirements.

Marshall S. Carter  
Lieutenant General, USA  
Deputy Director

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

27 February 1963

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MEMORANDUM FOR:

Chairman, President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

SUBJECT: Interim Report to the President by the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, dated December 28, 1962

At its last meeting the Special Group considered Recommendations 3 and 5 of your Interim Report to the President dated December 28, 1962, along with comments on these recommendations from the DCI, CIA, State and Defense.

The Group agreed with the objectives of Recommendation 3, and it has under continual review the question of adequate aerial reconnaissance of Cuba. With respect to satellite coverage, it appears that within the reasonably near future the technical characteristics of these vehicles will make it impossible to cover the intelligence requirements adequately. Drones are available on a standby basis and could be employed if necessary.

The Group agrees further that on-the-ground photography in Cuba is highly desirable, and some clandestine agents will be provided with appropriate equipment. It was recognized, however, that this is a highly risky endeavor with limited chances of success under existing circumstances.

Recommendation 5 was noted by the Special Group. The members agreed completely with the view that unusually risky intelligence operations be referred to the Presidential level for decision whenever there is a serious need to balance opportunity against risk. On matters of this kind the Group frequently refers the decision to the President, and in such cases considers itself simply as advisory to him. This procedure will continue to be followed.

*McGeorge Bundy*  
McGeorge Bundy

cc: Special Group Members

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